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The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) evolved from pressure in
the early 1980s to find an ultimate, authoritative and neutral solution to
judicial disputes among athletes, international and national sports feder-
ations, national Olympic committees and Olympic and other games or-
ganizers. The Olympic Movement decided to create a final and binding
court of arbitration for all sports related disputes, including doping cases.
The CAS was established on April 6, 1983, at an IOC session in New
Delhi1 and since it's inception has dealt with sports-specific disputes of a
private nature. The Court provides a forum for the world's athletes and
sports federations to resolve their disputes through a single independent
and accomplished sports adjudication body. The CAS has demonstrated
its ability to consistently apply the rules of different sports organizations
and the worldwide rules of the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code2
in a fair and evenhanded manner. The CAS is in the course of develop-
ing universal principles that are becoming recognized as the lex sportiva3
and has established a worldwide reputation of competence in dealing
with sports-related disputes. Despite the growth and success of the CAS,
1. DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 1986-1998 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 2000). Tricia Kavanagh, The
Doping Cases and the Need for the International Court of Arbitration for Sport, 22 UNSW L.J.
721 (1999). For a complete discussion of the history, see Richard McLaren, A New Order:
Athletes' Rights and the Court of Arbitration at the Olympic Games, VII OLYMPIKA: THE INT'L
J. OF OLYMPIC STUDIES 1 (1998).
2. INT'L OLYMPIC COMM., MED. COMM'N, The Anti-Doping Code, available at http://
www.olympic.org/iocle/org/medcom/medcom%5Fantidopage%5Fe.html (last visisted Nov. 5,
2001); INT'L OLYMPIC COMM., MED. COMM'N, Explanatory Memorandum Concerning the Ap-
plication of the Olympic Movement Ant-Doping Code, available at http://www.olympic.org/ioc/
e/org/medcom/pdf/addenda cio antidopage.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2001).
3. A term coined by the Acting General Secretary of CAS Matthieu Reeb at the time of
the publishing of the first digest of CAS decisions stretching over the period from 1983-1998.
Richard McLaren, The Court of Arbitration for Sport: An Independent Arena for the World's
Sports Disputes, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 379 (2001).
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some International Federations (IFs) have not agreed to provide for
CAS arbitrations.4
The following discussion will be divided into two parts. First, there
will be an explanation of the history, structure and procedures of the
CAS. Next, there will be a discussion of the substantive legal issues and
principles that constitute the growing body of lex sportiva developed by
the Court through its Ad Hoc Division (AHD) at the Olympic Games.
I. TH FUNCTION OF CAS
The CAS functions outside of all sports organizations in order to set-
tle sports-related disputes through arbitration. The Code in Article S 1
provides for arbitration "only in so far as the statutes or regulations of
the said sports bodies or a specific agreement. .. " exist establishing the
CAS jurisdiction. Thus, CAS arbitration, as with most arbitration, is
founded upon contractual agreement. Any natural or artificial person
with the capacity to effect a legal transaction may have recourse to the
CAS. This includes, international sports federations and sports associa-
tions, sports organizing committees, radio sponsors, television broadcast-
ers and any other corporation involved in a sports- related dispute.
Clauses providing for CAS arbitration are contained in the Olympic
Charter,5 the Olympic Athlete Entry Form-Eligibility Conditions,6 and
within the regulations, constitutions and athlete forms of ports bodies
around the world.
4. The International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) and F6dration Internationale
de Football Association (FIFA) are two such bodies. Erica Bulman, IAAF Considering Turn-
ing To Court Of Arbitration, ASSOCIATED PRESS, available at http://sports.yahoo.com/m/sa/
news/ap/20001128/ap-iaaf-doping.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2001). However, it should be noted
that at its Congress in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada in August 2001, the IAAF passed a resolu-
tion adopting CAS arbitration. IAAF News Letter, Issue No. 50, Aug. 2001, at 2.
5. Ir'L OLYMPIC COMM., Ti OLYMPIC CHARTER, art. 74, available at http://
www.olympic.orgliocle/facts/charter/charter-protocol-e.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2001). The
Article states: "Any dispute arising on the occasion of, or in connection with, the Olympic
Games shall be submitted exclusively to the Court of Arbitration for Sport in accordance with
the Code of Sports-Related Arbitration" (emphasis added).
6. All athletes participating in the Olympic Games are required to sign this form. The
form contains the following clause, at paragraph 7: "I agree that any dispute in connection
with the Olympic Games, not resolved after exhaustion of the legal remedies established by
my NOC, the International Federation governing my sport, the Sydney Organising Committee
for the Olympic Games (SOCOG) and the IOC, shall be submitted exclusively to the Court of
Arbitration for Sport (CAS) for final and binding arbitration.... ." Athlete Entry Form, Syd-
ney Olympics (Sept. 2000) (on file with author).
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The Code of Sports Related Arbitration7 (the "Code") is applied to
settle sports-related disputes through arbitration. The Code is divided
into two parts: Statutes of the Bodies Working for the Settlement of
Sports-related Disputes (S1-S26) and Procedural Rules (R27-69). In this
regard, the CAS operates using two different proceedings; (1) ordinary
arbitration proceedings; and, (2) appeal arbitration proceedings. For dis-
putes resulting from contractual relations or wrongful acts, the ordinary
procedure is applicable. On the other hand, the appeal procedure ap-
plies to disputes resulting from decisions of sports federations or associa-
tions.8 On rare occasions CAS may take on an entirely ad hoc
procedure.9 Upon request, the CAS is also able to provide advisory
opinions on any issue concerning the practice or development of sport or
any activity relating to sport that is not the subject of any dispute.' ° Fi-
nally, an ad hoc division (AHD) was created by the governing body of
CAS, the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS),11 to
preside over disputes arising during the Olympics. 2
The broad mandate of the Court places a vast number of disputes
within the ambit of CAS arbitration. The CAS commenced its jurispru-
dential life with its first case in 1986.13 Since that time, the CAS has
issued eight Advisory Opinions and rendered 172 awards through the
Appeal and Ordinary procedures of the Code.14 In addition, the AHD
7. COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, CODE, available at http://www.tas-cas.org/english/
code/fracode.asp (last visited Aug. 1, 2001) [hereinafter CODE].
8. COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, Presentation: What Are the CAS Arbitration Pro-
cedures?, available at http://www.tas-cas.org/english/presentation/frapresentation.asp (last vis-
ited Aug. 1, 2001).
9. See Mecca-Medina & Majocen v. FINA, No. 2000/A/270 (CAS Arb. 2001) and the
specific arbitration agreement used to hold a second round of hearings in the case. The Arbi-
tration agreement is set out in its entirety in the decision.
10. CODE, supra note 7, at R. 60-62. These Rules provide for advisory requests and are
only employed in very rare cases, but can have a profound impact. For the most recent advi-
sory opinion that has been rendered by the CAS, see Body Suit Opinion, Advisory opinion for
the CAS TAS 2000/C/267 AOC.
11. CODE, supra note 7, at art. S6.8 (creating the AHD).
12. The AHD follows the rules set out in the Code and special additional rules created for
the Olympic Games. COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, ARBITRATION RULES FOR THE
GAMES OF THE XXVII OLYMPIAD IN SYDNEY, available at http://www.tas-cas.org/english/
rules/fraRules.asp (last visited Aug. 1, 2001) [hereinafter OG RULES].
13. Niedershasli Hockey Club v. Swiss Nat'l Hockey Fed'n, No. 86/01 (CAS 1986).
14. The exact breakdown is as follows: between 1986-1994, 76 requests for arbitration and
55 requests for advisory opinions, resulting in 32 awards and 6 advisory opinions; between
1995-2000, under the revised Code, 30 requests for arbitration (ordinary procedure), 141 ap-
peals, and 11 requests for advisory opinions, resulting in 140 awards and 2 opinions. Letter
from Lise Narbel to Jim Bunting (Feb. 26, 2001) (on file with author). (Great appreciation is
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has decided 26 Olympic cases over the course of two Summer Games
(Atlanta and Sydney) and the Nagano Winter Games.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SPORTS
ARBITRATION (ICAS)
Today the court is responsible to the ICAS15 that was established to
provide a layer of insulation from one of the Court's primary sources of
funds, the International Olympic Committee (IOC). ICAS is a 20-mem-
ber council composed of high-level jurists. It elects its own officers from
its membership and appoints CAS division presidents and their depu-
ties. 6 The members, who consist of representatives of the International
Sports Federations, National Olympic Committees and the International
Olympic Committee, must sign a declaration "undertaking to perform
their functions in a personal capacity with total objectivity and indepen-
dence and in conformity with the provisions of the Code of Sports-Re-
lated Arbitration. 1 7
The ICAS is responsible for a variety of administrative functions.
Article S6 of the Code sets out these functions, including amending the
Code; developing and maintaining the list of CAS arbitrators; con-
ducting challenges to CAS arbitrators and where necessary removing an
arbitrator; managing the funds allocated to its operations; appointing
and, upon proposal of the president, removing the Secretary General;
and supervising the Court Office of the CAS.'8
III. CAS STRUCTURE
The CAS is located in Lausanne, Switzerland, however, pursuant to
Article S6.8 regional or local, permanent or ad hoc offices can be estab-
lished. Pursuant to this provision, the ICAS has established offices in
New York, USA and Sydney, Australia. The Lausanne office handles
the majority of the CAS proceedings. However, where it is deemed ap-
extended to Lise Narbel and Matthieu Reeb, Acting Secretary General of the CAS, for pro-
viding this information).
15. For a history of the events leading up to the creation of ICAS in 1993, see McLaren,
supra note 1, at 3-4.
16. CODE, supra note 7, at art. S6(2). The ICAS elects the ICAS president that is pro-
posed by the IOC. The ICAS president is also the CAS president. Id. at art. S9. This consti-
tutes an improvement over the initial CAS rule where the IOC president was also the CAS
president and the amended CAS rule formerly providing that the IOC president choose the
CAS president from among the members of the CAS.
17. Id. at art. S5.
18. M. art. R34 (providing for a challenge to an arbitrator); see also id. at art. R35 (pro-
viding for the possible removal of a CAS arbitrator).
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propriate, arbitration hearings can be held at another location.19 In this
manner, proceedings can be referred to either of the two regional of-
fices. The Sydney office, or Oceania Registry, deals extensively with dis-
putes arising within Australia. That regional office addressed an array of
selection disputes prior to the Sydney Games. Australian athletes have
recourse to the CAS Oceania Division by virtue of arbitration clauses
within the rules of the Australian Olympic Committee.
The regional office in New York (formerly in Denver) has, in con-
trast, not been nearly as active as its Oceania counterpart. It had origi-
nally been set up in contemplation of the Olympic Games as was the
Oceania division. However, CAS was less familiar to the sporting com-
munity at the time and the AHD of CAS was about to commence opera-
tions for the first time in Atlanta in 1996. Following the creation of the
United States Anti-Doping Agency20 (USADA) on October 1, 2000, a
different use of CAS was proposed by USADA.21
Permanent regional CAS offices provide convenient and effective
implementation of CAS proceedings in their locale in different parts of
the world. The success of the New York office and the Oceania Registry
will likely lead to the establishment of additional regional CAS offices.2"
The same provisions that allow the ICAS to establish regional offices
also provide for the creation of an ad hoc division of CAS to preside
over the Olympic Games.
19. Id. at art. R28.
20. This organization took over from the various national governing bodies and the
United States Olympic Committee to create a national testing agency for anti-doping in the
US. U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, What is USADA?, available at http://www.usantidoping.org/
whatis/index.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2001).
21. Under USADA rules, when an athlete tests positive and the B sample confirms that
test, the athlete has two courses of adjudication. Athletes can elect to take their dispute di-
rectly to the international version of CAS, although the case would be heard in the USA, not
in Lausanne. Alternatively, athletes can have their disputes heard by the American Arbitra-
tion Association (AAA), but only by CAS accredited arbitrators. Under this election there is
a further appeal to the international version of CAS, but again the case would be heard in the
USA. Id. at Athletes: USADA Protocol for Olympic Testing, available at http://www.usanti
doping.org/athletes/protocol_2.asp (last visited Aug. 1, 2001).
22. At the time of this writing the Canadian Secretary of State for Amateur Sport had
announced that there would be a new ADR system for Canadian sports persons in place
before the close of the year 2001. An ADR implementation committee was working on a
unified set of arbitration rules using the CAS Code as the model. This might result in a
further model for a national CAS system. Letter from Denise Codere, Canadian Sports Min-
ister to Richard McLaren, Professor of Law, Univ. of W. Ontario (Feb. 2001) (on file with
author).
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IV. THE DESIGN AND JURISDICTION OF THE AHD
The AHD is designed to augment, and not to attenuate, athletes'
rights.' Article 74 of the Olympic Charter and a clause contained in the
Olympic Athlete Entry Form affirms the Court's jurisdiction over the
games. Disputes are presided over by a panel of three arbitrators from a
pool of CAS arbitrators specially selected by ICAS for the Games. Any
decision is final and binding with no possibility of appeal.24 Prior to the
Sydney Games, the AHD presided over the Atlanta and Nagano
Games.25
Any proceedings of the AHD are governed by the CAS Arbitration
Rules for the Games designed and enacted prior to each Olympiad by
the ICAS.26 These special rules are used in addition to the Code. The
proceedings are further governed by Chapter 12 of the Swiss Private In-
ternational Law Act of 18 December 1987 (PIL Act). The PIL Act ap-
plies to arbitration as a result of the express choice of law contained in
Article 17 of the OG Rules, and as a result of the choice of Lausanne,
Switzerland as the seat of the ad hoc Division, pursuant to Article 7 of
the OG Rules. Further, pursuant to Article 17 of the OG Rules, Arbi-
tration Panels must decide disputes "pursuant to the Olympic Charter,
the applicable regulations, general principles of law and the rules of law,
the application of which it deems appropriate."'27 Finally, Article 16 pro-
vides that a Panel has "full power to establish the facts on which the
application is based."
V. THE COURT PROCEDURE
Proceedings before the AHD are governed by the OG Rules. The
OG Rules follow informal court-like procedures that apply the princi-
ples of natural justice and due process.' The arbitration process begins
when an application is filed with the court office of the AID.2 9 Upon
23. Michael J. Beloff, The Court of Arbitration for Sport at the Olympics, 4 SPORTS AND
THE L. J. 5 (1996).
24. For a rare example of an attempt to appeal a decision of the Ad Hoc Division, see the
December 4, 2000 decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal court. Raducan v. Comit6 Int'l
Olympique, 5P.42712000 (Arrdt Du Tribunal Fdddral Suisse 2000).
25. For a discussion of the AHD experience at the Atlanta and Nagano Games, see Mc-
Laren, supra note 1.
26. See generally OG RuLES, supra note 12.
27. Id. at art. 17.
28. Michael J. Beloff, QC, The CAS Ad Hoc Division At The Sydney Olympic Games,
INT'L SPORTS L. REv. (2001) (on file with author).
29. OG RULES, supra note 12, at art. 10.
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
receipt of an application, the President of the AHD3  forms an arbitral
panel31 of three independent arbitrators.32
The AHD serves notice of the application to the respondent, along
with notice of the hearing.33 The CAS has also developed the practice of
serving notice to third parties that could be affected by the AHD award.
In certain circumstances, the President, or the Panel where it is al-
ready formed, can provide interim relief to an applicant without first
hearing from the respondent.34 Such relief will be granted upon consid-
eration of such factors as whether the applicant stands to suffer irrepara-
ble harm; whether the application will likely succeed on its merits; and
whether the interests of the applicant outweigh those of the respondent
or other members of the Olympic Community. Any interim measures
awarded by the AHD cease to be effective when a decision is rendered
under Article 20.
Article 15(b) of the Special Rules grants the AHD extensive powers
and discretion to organize the procedure in the hearing. In principle
"... the Panel would hold one single hearing, during which each party
(including an interested party) presented its case. ."I' Article 15(d)
provides a similar discretion in relation to evidence. The AHD also has
the power to establish the facts upon which an application is based.37
This allows the Panel to consider any relevant facts at "first instance,"
regardless of whether they have been previously established. The AHDs
broad range of discretion, in organizing the proceedings and considering
evidence, results in a mixture of styles in conducting the hearings. Some
hearings were conducted on the inquisitorial principle, others more on
the common law approach of formal oral evidence and submissions. The
result has been that the AHD has preserved a wide range of powers to
study the case and to clarify the material truth. Thus, the process is a
curious mixture of the civil law approach through the use of the inquisi-
torial principle and the common law approach of examination and cross-
examination.
30. The President is selected by the ICAS. Id. at art. 4.
31. Id. at art. 11.
32. Arbitrators are required to be unconnected to the parties of a dispute. Id. at art. 12.
It should also be noted the OG Rules provide for a single arbitrator panel in exceptional
circumstances. Id. at art. 11.
33. Id. at art. 15(c).
34. Id. at art. 14.
35. See supra note 12.
36. Beloff, supra note 28, at § 5.2.
37. OG RULES, supra note 12, at art. 16.
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The AHD is required to provide a decision within twenty-four hours
of the lodging of the application, unless the President extends the time
limit." The Panel is also required to provide brief written reasons for its
decisions,39 although in practice the decisions contain a comprehensive
analysis. The decisions rendered by the AHD are final and binding, and
may not be appealed or challenged.40 However, to the extent that it is
possible to appeal a decision of the AHD, the location of the seat of
arbitration in Lausanne limits an appeal to the Swiss Federal Tribunal.41
VII. TH DEVELOPMENT OF Lex Sportiva at the Olympic Games
The first portion of this paper explored the history, structure and pro-
cedures of the CAS. The remainder of this discussion focuses on the
substantive legal issues and principles that constitute the growing body
of lex sportiva developed by the CAS AHD. These principles will be
illustrated through the ensuing analysis of the AIHDs Olympic decisions.
A. Types of Disputes arising during the Games
The Olympics have proven to be a fruitful time for the development
of lex sportiva and a variety of disputes has arisen prior to and during the
Games.
These disputes include issues regarding:
I) The jurisdiction of the CAS;
II) Affected Third Parties and National eligibility rules;
III) Validity of athlete suspensions by the IOC and IFs;
IV) The principle of non-interference with the decisions of sports
officials;
V) Doping violations and the existence of strict liability regime;
VI) The resolution of commercial advertising issues at the Games;
and
VII) The manipulation of sporting rules for strategic advantage.
38. Id at art. 18.
39. Id. at art. 19.
40. Id. at art. 21.
41. See supra note 24.
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1. The jurisdiction of the CAS
As previously noted, Article 1 of the CAS Arbitration Rules for the
Games42 provides for disputes arising during the Games to be resolved
by the AHD. The AHD also has jurisdiction over the IFs at the Games
by consideration of CAS arbitration clauses in their bylaws or
regulations.
Two of the AHDs decisions at the Nagano Games addressed this
question of jurisdiction. The first case, Schaatsefabriek Viking B.V v.
German Speed-Skating Association (Viking), involved a request from a
Skate Manufacturing Corporation for an order prohibiting members of
the German National Skating Federation from wearing skate covers
manufactured by a rival firm.43 The AHD did not provide the requested
award on the basis that the Olympic Charter had not been violated.
However, the Court stressed that its decision was in no way a determina-
tion of whether the Manufacturing Corporation had a valid legal claim.
Rather, the AHD noted that it was confined to dealing with disputes
arising at, or in connection with the Games. In absence of a clear viola-
tion of the Olympic Charter or other applicable rules, the AHD did not
have jurisdiction to render an award at the Games.
In a second case that arose during the Nagano Games, Steele v. CIO,
the AHD provided further guidance as to the extent of its jurisdiction.'
Steele raised an application claiming that the International Ski Federa-
tion had improperly excused him from competition. He claimed that he
was eligible to compete in the Games under the rules of the Puerto Ri-
can Ski Federation (PRSF). However, the CAS noted that the Puerto
Rican Olympic Committee recognized the Puerto Rican Winter Sports
Federation as its official winter sports body, not the PRSF. Therefore,
Steele was not an accredited athlete and did not have standing to bring
the dispute to the AHD.
Three disputes during the Sydney Games considered the breadth of
the AHDs jurisdiction. All three of these disputes involved the Interna-
tional Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF), which does not provide for
CAS arbitration in its rules or its constitution. As a consequence, the
consensual underpinnings for arbitration contained in most IF rules
42. OG RULES, supra note 12, at art. 1. These rules are issued in connection with the
Games to augment the Code and are promulgated by ICAS pursuant to powers conferred in
Article S6.8 of the Code.
43. Schaatsefabriek Viking B.V v. German Speed-Skating Association (Viking), (Nagano
Winter Olympic Games, 1998) (unpublished decision).
44. Steele v. CIO, (Nagano Winter Olympic Games, 1998) (unpublished decision).
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could not be relied on for jurisdiction. The IAAF has its own internal
arbitration procedure using its "Arbitration Panel," whose jurisdiction is
directed only at disputes inside the IAAF, including determinations of
the games rules by member federations and their application to athletes.
Thus, the jurisdiction of the IAAF Arbitration Panel came into conflict
with that of the AHD at the Sydney Games.
Dieter Baumann is a German middle distance runner, and was the
Olympic 5000 meter champion in 1992 at Barcelona. He had been
cleared of an alleged doping infraction by his IAAF member federation,
the German Athletic Federation (DLV). He was, therefore, properly ac-
credited for participation in the Sydney Games by the IOC. The IAAF
believed that the DLV had made an erroneous decision related to doping
control and brought the case before its Arbitration Panel sitting in Syd-
ney.45 The Panel found a doping infraction to have occurred and applied
the sanction of a two-year ineligibility on Baumann pursuant to Rule
60.2 of the IAAF Rules, thereby overruling the DLV decision. At the
request of the IAAF, the IOC removed the athlete's accreditation. Bau-
mann, who had not been a party to the IAAF arbitration, brought an
appeal to the AHD, which had jurisdiction over the athlete by virtue of
the Games entry form.46 The IAAF raised a preliminary objection dis-
puting the jurisdiction of the AHD because of the absence of a CAS
arbitration clause in its constitution and the fact that its own Panel had
just made a final and binding determination.
The AHD dismissed the objection.47 It held that it had jurisdiction
over the accreditation decision.' Both the IOC and the IAAF, being
members of the Olympic movement, were deemed to have subscribed to
the arbitration clause within the Olympic Charter pursuant to Article 74.
The IAAF then proceeded to withdraw from the proceedings and
walked out of the hearing room.
45. The jurisdiction to so act arises out of Rule 21.3(ii) and 59.2 of the IAAF Constitution.
LAURI TARASTI, LEGAL SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL DOPING CASES: AwARDs BY THE
IAAF ARBITRATION PANEL 1985-1999 171 (2000). See also Bevilacqua Case 25.11.1996,
IAAF v. Federazione Italiana di Atletica Leggera FIDAL, Ct. Arb. Case, cited in TARAsTI,
supra, at 143.
46. Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000) 006, Dieter Baumann v. Inter-
national Olympic Committee (IOC), National Olympic Committee of Germany and Interna-
tional Amaeur Athletics Federation (IAAF), award of 22 September, 2000, in CAS AWARDS -
SYDNEY: THE DECISIONS DELIVERED BY THE AD HOC DIVISION OF =H COURT OF ARBITRA-
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The AHD, having established jurisdiction over the involved parties,
addressed a preliminary claim that this case could not be heard because
it would be contrary to the principle of res judicata.49 The Panel dis-
missed this contention noting that neither Baumann nor the IOC had
been a party to the IAAF arbitration, and that the issues in dispute had
been expanded and now included loss of athlete accreditation at the
Olympic Games. Therefore, the AHD was seized of the dispute and
able to examine the merits of Baumann's case. Despite reaching this
determination, the AHD did not interfere with the IAAF's previous de-
cision once it was satisfied that the IAAF Arbitration Panel had dealt
with all of the evidence. The AHD effectively operated as an appeal
court over the IAAF. The removal of Baumann's accreditation was held
to be valid and the athlete was no longer able to compete in the
Games.50
A second dispute, brought before the AHD by Melinte, raised simi-
lar issues to those addressed in Baumann." The applicant was the world
record holder in the Women's Hammer Throw and had been accredited
by the IOC to compete in the Games upon her arrival in Sydney. How-
ever, Melinte had tested positive for nandrolone prior to the Games. On
September 17, 2000, the IAAF requested an explanation for the positive
test from the Romanian Athletic Federation. Thereafter, the IAAF ex-
ercised its ability to provisionally suspend an athlete following a positive
49. A matter that has been previously determined shall not be heard again. See generally
McLaren, supra note 3.
50. First Class Verdict of Guilt, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (Sep. 23, 2000)
[hereinafter First Class Verdict]; It Is Not Over, It Just Started, SAARBRUCKER ZEITUNG (Sep.
23, 2000) [hereinafter It Is Not Over]. It should be noted that despite being prohibited from
competition Baumann sought and received an injunction from the Frankfurt Higher Regional
Court authorizing him to compete. He has subsequently competed in a number of events
including the German National Indoor Championships. In response, the IAAF has applied
Rule 53.1 to any athlete who takes part in the same competition as Baumann. Rule 53.1 states
that any athlete who takes part in an event in which he knows another athlete to be ineligible
under IAAF Rules is himself ineligible. The rule has currently been applied to eight athletes.
Press Release, International Association of Athletics Federations, IAAF Statement in the
Baumann Case (Feb. 26, 2001) available at http://www.iaaf.org/News/PressRelease/
getnews.asp?Code=3218 (last visited Aug. 1, 2001). In addition, the IAAF has also said that
Baumann's two-year ban, which was due to be lifted in 2002, would be automatically extended
until 2003. KEEPING TRACK, INT'L TRACK & FIELD NEWSLETTER: ISSUE No. 106, Contami-
nated Runners (Janet Heinonen, ed., March 2001), available at http://www.runnersworld.com/
keepingtrack/mar2001.html.
51. Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.S. Sydney 2000) 015, Mihaela Melinte v. Interna-
tional Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF), award of 29 September, 2000, in CAS AWARDS,
supra note 46, at 145 [hereinafter Melinte].
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A sample. 2 Consequently, Melinte was removed from competition
while awaiting her turn to throw the hammer on the field of Stadium
Australia.
The case raised many of the issues that were addressed in the Bau-
mann decision and the AHD relied upon its previous determinations in
support of its jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. The IAAF still refused
to be recognized as a party to the dispute, but unlike the Baumann case
it participated in the hearing by answering questions. The AHD rejected
an attempt to distinguish the jurisdictional issues in this dispute from
those in Baumann, on the grounds that the IOC did not revoke Melinte's
accreditation. It dismissed this claim pointing out that the athlete had
been removed from the field of play in Stadium Australia and that con-
stituted a dispute arising during the Games within the meaning of Arti-
cle 74 of the Olympic Charter. 3
The primary issue raised by Melinte was that she had been denied
due process. The AED concluded that the information put before it by
Melinte would have been the same information provided to the IAAF.5 '
The AHD was not persuaded by the applicant's submissions and dis-
missed the application. However, the AHD noted that its decision was
not to be viewed as a determination of whether or not Melinte had com-
mitted a doping offence." Rather, the Panel's decision only denied the
applicant emergency relief with respect to her participation in the
Games. The IAAF procedures would have to be followed, first within
the member's process and perhaps subsequently before the IAAF Arbi-
tration Panel.5
52. Control of Drug Abuse, available at http:llwww.iaaf.org/InsideIAAF/index.asp (last
visited Aug. 1, 2001). Rule 59.2 provides for an immediate protective measure allowing for
the suspension of an athlete where the IAAF believes that a National Federation failed to
impose the proper suspension, before the case has been resolved at the National level, as it
had been in Baumann.
53. Melinte, supra note 51.
54. Id
55. Id.
56. Id Rule 59.2 forces the IAAF to put a case before its own arbitration panel where it
disagrees with a National Federations decision. Following the Olympic Games Melinte's case
was referred to IAAF arbitration. An IAAF panel found Melinte guilty of a doping offense
and she was suspended for two years. Press Release, International Association of Amateur
Federations, Melinte Suspended 2 Years, available at http://www.iaaf.org/News/PressReleases
(last visited July 17, 2001).
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The final case dealing with the jurisdiction of the AHD and the
IAAF involved Segura, a Mexican race walker in the 20km event.57 The
case involved the application of the games rules with respect to infrac-
tions leading to a disqualification.5" This time the IAAF was a full par-
ticipant before the AHD and argued its case. Ultimately, the AHD
rejected Segura's arguments and his application was dismissed.
The three Sydney cases illustrate that the IAAF had come full circle
in attorning to the jurisdiction of the AHD. It went from a refusal to
participate on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and a decision having
already been made; to remaining as an observer; and then finally submit-
ting to the AHDs jurisdiction and arguing its case. The change of atti-
tude apparently arose out of the way CAS dealt with the two previous
IAAF cases and the praise it had received in the German Newspapers 59
in connection to the Baumann case.
2. Affected third parties and National eligibility rules
It has been noted that CAS arbitration, as with most arbitrations, are
founded upon contractual agreement. This foundation raises an issue
regarding the extent to which a party who is not an applicant or a re-
spondent is affected by an arbitration award. The effect that an arbitra-
tion award has on third parties is a complex issue. One thing that is
clear, however, is that arbitration awards can have serious consequences
on parties who are not directly involved in the proceedings. The Code
and the OG Rules provide that the Panel has full control over the pro-
ceedings and can organize the procedure, as it deems appropriate.6 °
Therefore, in order to address this issue, the CAS developed the practice
of serving notice to interested third parties at the Sydney Games. The
Raguz case,6" the Perez trilogy62 and the related two Miranda decisions
63
57. Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.S. Sydney 2000), 013, Bernardo Segura v. Inter-
national Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), award of 30 September, 2000, in CAS
AWARDS, supra note 46, at 131 [hereinafter Segura].
58. This issue is dealt with in more detail in Section F.I.IV.
59. First Class Verdict, supra note 50; It Is Not Over, supra note 50.
60. OG RULES, supra note 12, at art. 15(b); CODE, supra note 7, at R. 44.3.
61. Raguz v. Sullivan, 2000 NSWCA 290 (New South Wales Ct. App. 2000), in CAS
AWARDS, supra note 46, at 185 [hereinafter Raguz].
62. Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.S. Sydney 2000) 001, United States Olympic
Comm. (USOC) and USA Canoe/Kayak v. International Olympic Comm. (IOC), award of 13
September, 2000, in CAS AWARDS, supra note 46, at 13 [hereinafter Perez 1]; Arbitration
CAS ad hoc Division (O.S. Sydney 2000) 005, Angel Perez v. International Olympic Commit-
tee (IOC), award of 19 September, 2000, in CAS AWARDS, supra note 46, at 53 [hereinafter
Perez 2]; Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.S. Sydney 2000) 009, in the matter of Angel
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illustrate the problem of the extent to which affected parties are bound
by a CAS decision.
Prior to the commencement of the 2000 Olympic Games in Australia,
the CAS Oceania division heard and rendered a decision in relation to a
dispute between an Australian judo athlete, Rebecca Sullivan, and the
Judo Federation of Australia, Inc.' Ms. Sullivan claimed that a proper
implementation of the nomination criteria would have resulted in her
selection to the Olympic team over Angela Raguz. The CAS Oceania
Division nominated Ms. Raguz as an affected party. The Panel found in
favor of Ms. Sullivan and the decision was eventually appealed to the
New South Wales (NSW) Court of Appeal. 5 The NSW Court held that
Ms. Raguz had been an affected party by the interlocking contractual
agreements that existed between the athletes and their sports federa-
tion.6 In this regard, the CAS award was held to be binding upon Ms.
Raguz.
The Miranda and Perez cases involved Nationality and Eligibility.
These cases called into question the structure of Article 46 in the
Olympic Charter.67 The section requires an athlete to have been a Na-
tional of a country for three years before he or she is eligible to compete
for that country. If an athlete fails to meet the criteria, he or she cannot
compete, unless the National Olympic Committee of the country where
the athlete previously resided waives the eligibility requirement. On its
face, this provision appears to be reasonable, however, the effect of the
section was not entirely anticipated.
Two athletes, Angel Perez and Arturo Miranda, were nominated by
their National Olympic Committees (the United States and Canada re-
spectively) to compete in the Sydney Olympics. Both athletes were born
in Cuba and had previously competed for their birth country. Neither
athlete established official citizenship in their new country until 1999.
Perez, award of 25 September, 2000, in CAS AwARDs, supra note 46, at 91 [hereinafter Perez
3].
63. Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.S. Sydney 2000) 003, Arturo Miranda v. Interna-
tional Olympic Committee (IOC), award of 13 September, 2000, in CAS AWARDS, supra note
46, at 29 [hereinafter Miranda 1]; Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.S. Sydney 2000) 008,
Arturo Miranda v. International Olympic Committee (IOC), award of 24 September, 2000, in
CAS AwARDs, supra note 46, at 83 [hereinafter Miranda 2].
64. Raguz, 2000 NSWCA 290.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. This rule is in place to ensure that any competitor in the Games is a National for the
Country they are competing for. It is designed to prohibit a Country from inappropriately
accrediting the athletes of another country.
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Thus, they both fell below the three year Nationality requirement. In
both instances, Cuba refused to waive the three year requirement.
In the first case in the Perez trilogy, Perez appeared as a witness but
was not served as an affected party. This case was decided against the
United States Olympic Committee (USOC), who had appeared on be-
half of Perez.68 However, since Perez had not been named as a party to
the arbitration, he was able to apply to the AHD to have his case heard
on its merits.
This resulted in Perez 2 that addressed many of the issues brought
forth in Perez 1 and thus, raised the question of res judicata. Ultimately,
the AHD ruled in favor of Perez.69 It should be noted, however, that if
Perez had been served as a party to Perez 1 the AHD might never have
heard the case on its merits in Perez 2.7o As it stood, Perez was not an
affected party in the Perez 1 case, with the only parties being the USOC
and the International Olympic Committee (IOC). In contrast, the Cu-
ban Olympic Committee (COC) had been served as an affected third
party in Perez 1 and Perez 2, but declined to attend.
Eventually, the COC recanted their decision not to attend the previ-
ous two hearings and brought the issue of Article 46 of the Olympic
Charter back to a differently constituted Panel of the AHD. In the final
decision of the Perez trilogy, the Panel held that the COC was estopped
from disputing that they were a party to Perez 2.71
The Miranda decisions addressed issues similar to those in the Perez
trilogy. Miranda 1 was brought before the AHD by the Cuban born
Canadian diver, Miranda, and the case was decided against him.7 2 How-
ever, after the CAS ruling in Perez 2, the Canadian Olympic Association
(COA) raised a subsequent application that became Miranda 2." The
facts between Miranda and Perez were sufficiently different that the
AHD found against the COA.
68. Perez 1, supra note 62.
69. Perez 2, supra note 62.
70. This was precisely the stance that the AHD took in Perez 3.
71. Perez 3, supra note 62, at T 28. The Panel held that the Cuban NOC had been aware
of the hearing, and indeed had made written representations to the Panel. In any event, the
Panel determined that a complaint regarding whether or not the COC had been given the
opportunity to be heard should have been directed to the Swiss Federal Tribunal and not to
CAS.
72. Miranda 1, supra note 63.
73. Miranda 2, supra note 63.
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3. Validity of athlete suspensions by the IOC and IFs
The validity of suspensions imposed by the IOC, an NOC, or an IF
has arisen as an issue on several occasions during the Games where the
CAS has presided.
The first case of this nature occurred at the Atlanta Games when an
athlete seized the flag from the Chef de Mission during the opening cere-
monies.74 After the incident, the Cape Verde NOC banned the athlete
from competition and subsequently obtained the consent of the IOC.
The athlete brought the dispute before the AHD and complained
that he had not been informed by the NOC or IOC of the allegations
against him, nor did he have an opportunity to respond. The AHD em-
phasized the importance of the sixth principle of the Olympic Charter
that stresses the importance of fair play. It held that this principle was
equally important to disciplinary proceedings as it to competitive
sports." The Panel granted the athlete interim relief so that he was able
to remain in the Olympic Village during the decision making process.76
The Ross Rebagliati case, brought before the AHD during the
Nagano Games, also considered the validity of an IOC ruling.77 Rebag-
liati, a Canadian snowboarder, had his gold medal rescinded because his
urine sample contained marijuana metabolites. The IOC based its deci-
sion on strict liability: the mere finding of marijuana in Rebagliati's sys-
tem constituted an offence. The issue before the AHD was whether the
finding of marijuana metabolites in Rebagliati's urine, in and of itself,
was an offence within the IOC Medical Code or the relevant interna-
tional sports federation (FIS). In this manner, the case parallels the Bro-
mantan cases in Atlanta (discussed below under doping violations).
The AHD concluded that the IOC Medical Code itself did not pro-
vide a basis for treating marijuana as a prohibited substance; such as it
would justify the sanction. Next, the AHD examined whether an agree-
ment to test for marijuana and impose sanctions in that regard was in
effect between the IOC and FIS. According to the AHD, the FIS had
adopted the IOC Medical Code in its entirety, and as the IOC Medical
Code did not provide a basis for treating marijuana as a prohibited sub-
74. Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Atlanta 1996) 002, A., W. and L. v. NOC
Cape Verde (NOC CV), award of July 27, 1996, in DIGEST OF CAS AwARDs 1986-1998, supra
note 1, at 389 (1998) [hereinafter Cape Verde].
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Rebagliati v. International Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS arbitration NAG 2 (Feb. 12,
1998) [hereinafter Rebagliati].
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stance, the sanction imposed against Rebagliati lacked the proper
foundation.
The Sydney Games resulted in a number of challenges being raised in
regard to IF and IOC suspensions. Two of the cases involved appeals
against the International Weightlifting Federation (IWF). The first of
these cases addressed the effect of a national court order on IFs. The
International Weightlifting Federation (IWF) adopted the Samoan
Weightlifting Federation's (SWF) suspension precluding a Samoan
weightlifter, Ofisa Jr. Ofisa, from participating in the Olympic Games.78
The athlete obtained a Samoan interim court order precluding the en-
forcement of the suspension imposed by the SWF. The AHD acknowl-
edged that the court order clearly affected the SWF, and as such
removed its ability to impose a suspension on the athlete.79 The AHD
held that the Samoan court order was not binding on the IWF. ° How-
ever, the keystone to the IWF's suspension was the SWF's decision.
Therefore, the Samoan court order removed the foundation of the IWF's
suspension and as a result the IWF's decision became invalid. Accord-
ingly, the CAS set aside the suspension."
The second case involving the IWF was similar to the one rendered
during the Nagano Games in respect to Rebagliati. In both instances, an
IF attempted to exercise powers that were not within its rules. In these
situations, the AHD continues to find that a federation must have a legal
basis for its disciplinary action. The dispute occurred after three athletes
of the Bulgarian Weightlifting Federation (BWF) tested positive for
banned substances, prompting the IWF to suspend the BWF. s The IOC
Executive Board allowed the suspension of the entire team. As a conse-
quence, a "clean" athlete and member of the BWF, Tzagaev became
ineligible to compete.
The IWF claimed that it had the power to suspend a federation for
one year following three positive drug tests in that year. The AHD
noted that the exact provision the IWF relied on only allowed a fine to
78. Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.S. Sydney 2000) 002, Samoa NOC and Sports
Federation Inc. v. International Weightlifting Federation (IWF), award of 12 September, 2000,
in CAS AWARDS, supra note 46, at 23 [hereinafter Samoa]. The suspension was based upon
alleged "sexual misconduct at the Oceania Weightlifting Championships" (alleged sexual rela-




82. Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.S. Sydney 2000) 010, Alan Tzagaev v. Interna-
tional Weightlifting Federation (IWF), award of 25 September, 2000, in CAS AWARDS, supra
note 46, at 101 [hereinafter Tzagaev].
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be imposed on a federation and a suspension resulted only upon failure
to pay the fine. The AHD held that the suspension of an entire federa-
tion from the Games, including athletes who have not committed a dop-
ing offence must have an explicit legal basis.83 Accordingly, the AHD
annulled the suspension and Tzagaev went on to win a silver medal.8 4
An application was also brought before the AHD in Sydney by the
NOC of Jesus Kibunde, a Congolese boxer.8 Kibunde had been barred
from competing by the International Amateur Boxing Association.
(AIBA) after he failed to compete in the boxing preliminaries. Kibunde
did not participate in the preliminaries as he missed the initial weigh in
and medical examination after personal problems, including a canceled
flight and difficulty at customs.
Kibunde referred to fundamental provisions of the Olympic move-
ment, arguing that he was entitled to compete. Assessing the validity of
the AIBA's decision the Panel held
.. that the relevant rule was unequivocal; had a practical founda-
tion; and could not be waived ... Any such waiver of the rule
would have involved a risk to other competitors and a departure
from the principle of equality of treatment. .86
Thus, in this instance the Al-D concluded that the athlete had been
properly barred from competition.
These five cases reveal the independence with which the AHD car-
ries out its adjudicative function. In each case, the AHD affirmed that
an athlete can only be suspended where there is an explicit legal basis for
the sanction
4. The principle of non-interference with the decisions of sports
officials
The case of Christopher Mendy v. International Amateur Boxing As-
sociation (AIBA), which arose during the Atlanta Games, discussed the
principle of non-interference with the decisions of officials made in the
course of competition.87 Christopher Mendy was a French boxer who
83. IL
84. Id.
85. Arbitrage Chambre ad hoe du TAS (J.O. Sydney 2000) 004, Comit6 Olympique Con-
golais (COC) et Jesus Kibunde c/ Association Internationale de Boxe Amateur (AIBA), sen-
tence rendue le 18 septembre, 2000, in CAS AwARDS, supra note 46, at 41 (2000).
86. Belof supra note 28, at 6.13.
87. Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Atlanta 1996) 006, Mendy v. Association In-
temationale de Boxe Amateur (ABA), award of August 1, 1996, in DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS
1986-1998, supra note 1, at 413 (1998).
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was disqualified for punching below the belt. He claimed that video re-
plays illustrated the punch was not below the belt, and consequently, his
disqualification should be overturned. The AHD held that it was be-
yond its jurisdiction to review the application of technical rules of a
sport.88 Such rules are the responsibility of the federation concerned,
and the judges and referees are in a far better position to determine the
application of such rules. Accordingly, the action was dismissed.89
Two cases at the Sydney Games confirmed the application of the
non-interference rule developed in Atlanta. Rumyana Dimitrova
Neykova applied to the AHD on the grounds that the equipment relied
upon for the determination of her second place finish in the Women's
Single Skull event, was inaccurate.9" The AHD applied the principle of
non-interference in determining that it could not overturn judgment calls
and technical decisions rendered during an event. However, the AHD
held that it does have jurisdiction to determine if equipment is faulty.9
In this instance, the AHD held that the technical equipment was in
proper working order and there was no proof indicating otherwise.92
Consequently, the application was dismissed.93
The principle of non-interference arose as part of another Sydney
case, discussed above under the jurisdiction of the AHD. After finishing
in first place a Mexican race walker, Segura, was disqualified from the
20km walk event, some 15 minutes after he had crossed the finish line.
While being congratulated on a mobile phone by the president of Mex-
ico, he was disqualified for committing infractions during the course of
the event.
The disqualification occurred because three course judges deter-
mined that the athlete had failed to keep one foot on the ground at all
times, pursuant to the Rules of the event. The AHD decided that the
relevant IAAF rules do not provide that disqualifications are invalid if
they are not communicated immediately.94 Accordingly, the AHD re-
jected Segura's argument that the way the IAAF officials had dealt with
the consequences of the three warnings had violated his rights. The
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.S. Sydney 2000) 012, Rumyana Dimitrova
Neykova v. International Rowing Federation (FISA) and International Olympic Committee





94. Segura, supra note 57.
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AHD held that it could not review a determination of the "rules of the
game" unless the rules had been applied in bad faith.95 In this respect,
the AHD concluded that it could not reverse the judges' decision unless
it was shown that the error on the part of the judges, in failing to com-
municate the disqualification to Segura promptly, would compel the re-
versal of the decision.96 There was no basis for such an outcome and the
disqualification was upheld.
5. Doping violations and the existence of strict liability regime
The requisite burden of proof for the determination of a doping of-
fence can be found in the rules of the IFs. During the Olympic Games,
however, a strict liability regime applies to doping offences by applica-
tion of Chapter II, Article 2 of the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping
Code.97 Article 2.2 provides that "[d]oping is... the presence in the
athlete's body of a Prohibited Substance." Thus, if a prohibited sub-
stance is confirmed to be present in an athlete's body, a doping offence is
committed irrespective of any other factors. Article 3.3 automatically
applies to invalidate any competition results achieved when an offence
occurs during an event.98 However, the subjective elements of each case
are something that the IOC can consider when determining the appro-
priate sanction.99 In this respect, once a positive finding of a prohibited
substance is confirmed, there are very few legal issues for the AH-D to
consider.
The case of Andreea Raducan 0 0 at the Sydney Games demonstrates
the application of a strict liability regime. Raducan, a Romanian Gym-
nast, placed first in the Women's Individual All-Round Event. Follow-
95. Id.
96. Id
97. The Anti-Doping Code, supra note 2, available at http:llwww.olympic.org/ioc/e/org
medcom/medcom%5Fantidopage%5Fe.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2001).
98. Whether or not doping has occurred during a competition depends on the facts of
each case. In Haga v. Federation Internationale De Motocyclisme (FIM), TAS 2000/A/281
(2000), a Superbike rider tested positive for a Prohibited Substance after the second race on
the same day. The facts of the case were such that the athlete was only found to have commit-
ted a doping offence in respect to one of the races and as a consequence only the results from
that race were invalidated.
99. The Anti-Doping Code, supra note 2, at ch. 2 art. 3, available at http://www.olympic.
org/ioc/e/org/medcom/medcom%5Fantidopage%5Fe.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2001) (provid-
ing a great deal of latitude in regard to the appropriate sanctions to be imposed in addition to
the invalidation of any competition results).
100. Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.S. Sydney 2000) 011, Andreea Raducan v. Inter-
national Olympic Committee (IOC), award of 28 September, 2000, in CAS AwARDs, supra
note 46, at 111 [hereinafter Raducan].
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ing her victory, she tested positive for the prohibited substance
pseudoephedrine. Despite the high publicity this case received, from a
legal perspective the case was not complex. Raducan argued that she
bore no responsibility for the doping violation because the positive test
resulted from pills given to her by the team doctor. She also claimed
that the level of the drug in her system was not sufficient to have been
performance enhancing. The AHD sympathized with the applicant, but
acknowledged that doping is a strict liability offence and an element of
intention is not required for the commission of a violation.' The Panel
also stated that whether or not a competitive advantage is achieved does
not affect whether there has been a doping offence."' 2 The AHD found
that a doping offence had occurred and the applicable rules resulted in
the invalidation of Raducan's performance. 10 3 A great deal of sympathy
was generated for the athlete amongst the public, but the AHD noted
that an appreciation of the subjective elements of individual cases is al-
lowed in the IOCs determination of what disciplinary sanction will arise
following the necessary disqualification."°
As noted above, Rebagliati had his gold medal performance initially
invalidated by the IOC. However, a doping offence can only be commit-
ted if a prohibited substance is found in an athlete's body. With respect
to Rebagliati the AHD found that marijuana was not a prohibited sub-
stance within the applicable rules at the time of the alleged infraction.
Thus, prior to an application of the strict liability regime it must first be
shown that the substance complained of is in fact prohibited. This issue
was discussed extensively in two disputes at the Atlanta Games.10 5
In Atlanta, two Russian Athletes, a wrestler and swimmer, were
stripped of their bronze medals. Both athletes tested positive for Bro-
101. Id.
102. However, it should be noted that it is often difficult to determine when a competitive
advantage has been achieved. On the facts of this particular case Raducan had concentrations
of pseudoephedrine of 90.6 and 88.0. The reporting threshold is 25.
103. Raducan, supra note 100.
104. Dissatisfied with the result, the matter was taken to the Swiss Federal Tribunal.
Raducan, 5P.427/2000. The Court found that factual issues about the quantity of urine sup-
plied did not infringe the applicant's right to be heard by restricting its answers on the factual
issues. It was determined that it could not be reasonably considered as having any impact on
the analysis of the AHD panel. It was also found that there had been no unequal treatment
inconsistent with the public order which was another grounds of appeal. Therefore, the Swiss
Tribunal Court refused to interfere in the findings or the result of the AHD and would not
declare a breach of the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code for failure to have the re-
quired 75ml minimum quantity of urine.
105. Korneev & Gouliev v. International Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS Arb. ad hoc Divi-
sion O.G. Atlanta (1998).
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mantan. Neither athlete contested the finding of the substance in his or
her body; rather they argued that Bromantan was not a prohibited sub-
stance. The drug was not included on the banned substance list at the
time of the Games and the question before the AHD was whether the
drug was prohibited as a ". . .a related substance."' 6 It was argued
before the AHD that Bromantan was a stimulant within the meaning of
the Medical Code, and therefore, a prohibited substance regardless of
the fact that it was not specifically listed. The AHD held that while fur-
ther research might demonstrate that Bromantan was a stimulant, the
evidence presented was not sufficient to draw that conclusion. 0 7 Ac-
cordingly, the athlete's medals were returned.
6. The resolution of commercial advertising issues at the Games
Two cases before the AHD have involved commercial advertising is-
sues. The Viking case arose during the Nagano Games and was dis-
cussed above in connection with the jurisdiction of the AHD. As noted,
Skate Manufacturing Corporation alleged that Article 61 of the Olympic
Charter had been breached.' The AHD found that the Charter had
not been breached and it did not have the requisite jurisdiction to award
relief.
The Sydney Games also gave rise to a commercial based dispute. 9
The dispute arose in relation to the size of a logo on a French gymnast's
leotard. Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Olympic Charter, articles of clothing
worn by athletes cannot be marked conspicuously for advertising pur-
poses and specific size requirements must be maintained. The major
determination for the AHD was whether the Rule should be read to
apply to clothing as it is manufactured or as it is worn. The AHD con-
cluded that the Rule included the phrase "... worn by the athletes," 10
and therefore, applied to clothing as worn, not as manufactured. How-
ever, the Panel did find that the Rule had been applied inconsistently in
106. The lists of prohibited substances are not exhaustive and any substance that is found
to be related to the substances included within the list will be deemed to be a prohibited
substance. The Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code 2000 had, by the time of the Sydney
Games, included Bromantan as a banned substance thus eliminating the argument of the case
in Atlanta.
107. Korneev & Gouliev, CAS Arb. ad hoc Division O.G. Atlanta.
108. Article 61: Propaganda and Advertising addresses a wide array of advertising issues.
109. Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.S. Sydney 2000) 014, Federation Francaise de
Gymnastique (FFG) v. Sydney Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG),
award of 30 September, 2000, in CAS AwARDs, supra note 46, at 137 [hereinafter FFG].
110. THE OLYMnIc CHARTRmn, supra note 2, at R. 61.
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that it had, incorrectly, not been applied to other competitors.'' This
factor did not alter the determination of the AHD that the Rule had
been correctly applied to the athlete in this case. The FFG application
was dismissed.
The Nagano and Sydney commercial disputes demonstrate the range
and breadth of cases arising from the Games that may come before the
AHD.
7. The manipulation of sporting rules for strategic advantage
Sometimes an IF, NOC or an athlete will seek to gain a strategic
advantage by manipulating sporting rules. Such activity occurred in At-
lanta and Nagano.
In Atlanta, the German and Netherlands swimming teams supported
an application by United States Swimming that sought a ruling to pro-
hibit Irish Swimmer, Michelle Smith, from entering the 400-meter frees-
tyle.112 The parties alleged that Smith's application had been submitted
past the deadline. The AHD decided that, despite the strict interpreta-
tion of the rules, it was common practice for competitors to switch be-
tween events once they were already entered in the Games." 3 This was
an unusual case as it demonstrates an obvious move to manipulate the
rules in order to eliminate a rival athlete from competition.
A similar case went before the AHD of CAS at the Nagano
Games." 4 Ulf Samuelson, a National Hockey League Player, competed
for Sweden in the Olympic Hockey tournament. Following the first
three games, the International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF) discovered
that by operation of Swedish Law, Samuelson had lost his citizenship
when he became an American citizen. The IIHF excluded Samuelson
from competing in the rest of the tournament.
The Swedish Olympic Committee appealed to the AHD to allow
Samuelson to compete. The Czech Olympic Committee also appealed to
the AHD requesting the invalidation of the games in which Samuelson
took part. A ruling in favour of the Czech Olympic Committee would
111. FFG, supra note 109.
112. Arbitration CAS ad hoe division (O.G. Atlanta 1996) 001, US Swimming v. Federa-
tion Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA), award as of July 22, 1996, in DIGEST OF
CAS AWARDS 1986-1998, supra note 1, at 377 (1998) [hereinafter Smith].
113. Id.
114. Arbitration CAS ad hoc division (O.G. Nagano 1998) 004-005, Czech Olympic Com-
mittee & Swedish Olympic Committee v. Samuelson v. International Ice Hockey Fed'n
(IIHF), award of Febraury 18, 1998, in DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 1986-1998, supra note 1, at
435 (1998) [hereinafter Samuelson].
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have reordered the playoff round to the Czechs advantage. Thus, there
was an attempt to manipulate the rules to one Country's advantage.
The AHD upheld the decision of the IIHF and Samuelson was ex-
cluded from play for failure to meet the eligibility requirements." 5 The
AHD dismissed the Czech application stating that the Czechs lacked suf-
ficient involvement to challenge the decision." 6 However, the AHD
noted that the outcome could have differed if the application had been
brought by either of the two teams Sweden defeated while Samuelson
was competing.
B. Developed Principles of Lex Sportiva
The Olympic Decisions make up part of a growing body of lex spor-
tiva. Within this body, specific rules have been developed and continu-
ally applied; the Olympic cases illustrate many of the fundamental
principles that the CAS has developed.
The decisions rendered during the Games have made it clear that the
AHD has full jurisdiction over any dispute arising at the Games. Only a
very limited number of disputes are outside of its prescribed jurisdiction.
As indicated by the Viking case, the AHD will decline jurisdiction to
render awards relating to disputes centered upon commercial issue,
which do not directly impact athletes or require immediate resolution.
These disputes should be addressed in civil courts. The Steele case illus-
trates that only certain types of persons, capable of entering legal rela-
tionships, will be able to apply to the AHD. However, the scope of
"persons" is broad and appears to be within the jurisdiction of the AHD
to hear any sports-related dispute during the Games, so long as the ap-
plicant party is more than a member of the public and has a direct con-
nection to the Olympic Games.
The Sydney Games decisions established the breadth of the AHDs
Jurisdiction. NOs and IFs with clauses providing for CAS arbitration are
explicitly within its jurisdiction. Further, the IOC, athletes, and other
sports organizations, including IFs that do not provide for CAS arbitra-
tion, are subject to the AHDs jurisdiction pursuant to the Olympic Ath-
lete Entry Form-Eligibility Conditions and Articles 29 and 74 of the
Olympic Charter. 17
The AHDs jurisdiction over doping offences committed prior to the
Games, however, is unclear. It appears that the AHD will assess an al-
115. Id.
116. Id
117. Baumann, supra note 46; Melinte, supra note 51.
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leged infraction on its face and render a provisional decision with respect
to the accused athlete's eligibility to compete in the Games. The ulti-
mate determination of the athlete's case will fall within the appropriate
jurisdiction outside of the games, where the positive drug test
occurred." 8
A variety of applications brought before the AHD in Sydney concen-
trated on Article 46 of the Olympic Charter and raised issues about the
principles of res judicata and estoppel.'19 In this regard, these decisions
suggest that the AHD will entertain an application by a party even
where the application addresses issues that have already been heard by
it. However, as demonstrated in Perez 3, so long as an interested party
has been served notice and has had an opportunity to participate in the
arbitration proceedings, the AHDs award will be binding upon that
party and they will be estopped from bringing further applications.
The extent to which an affected third party is bound by a CAS award
strikes at the very heart of the contractual underpinnings of CAS arbitra-
tion. While the matter has been addressed on an ad hoc basis, it will
require further refinement of the Code and the related OG Rules to
address the problem more completely. In the meantime, the practice of
the CAS and its jurisprudence, supported by the New South Wales Court
of Appeal, will remain the benchmarks by which to resolve the affected
third party issue. 20
A great number of the applications before the AHD are requests for
an order of the IOC or an IF to be overturned. In this regard, the AHD
has dealt extensively with the validity of suspensions and orders from the
IOC and IFs. In all of these disputes, the AHD has ensured that there is
a valid foundation upon which an order or suspension is based and that
any action taken by the IOC or IFs comply with the relevant rules. If
these requisite elements exist, the AHD is constrained entirely by law.
However, this does not mean that the AHD applies blind law. Where an
118. Melinte, supra note 51.
119. Perez 1, supra note 62; Perez 2, supra note 62; Perez 3, supra note 62; Miranda 1,
supra note 63; Miranda 2, supra note 63.
120. This is a point that The Law Commission for England and Wales, Working for Better
Law, available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/library/lc242 (last visited Feb. 1, 2001) addresses
in Part XIV of their report, at 14.15, 14.16. The Commission notes the problem of binding
third parties to arbitration awards when they have not agreed to be so bound. The Commis-
sion flirts with the idea that "an arbitration agreement ... could operate as a procedural
benefit to a third party and could also constitute a procedural condition on the third parties
right to enforce the substantive promise." However, the commission ultimately put aside this
possibility noting the difficulties arising out of the contractual nature of arbitration
agreements.
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injustice is committed, through a strict application of the law, the AHD
may exercise judicial interpretation to provide relief to the aggrieved
parties.1 2 ' However, this does not allow the AHD to step outside of the
legal realm and, thus the law still causes injustices for some parties. In
these situations, the AHD can only recommend that the IOC alter the
Olympic Charter. 22
The decisions of the AHD during the Olympic Games developed and
affirmed the principle of non-interference with decisions made in the
course of competition." The Games have also indirectly addressed the
issue of doping on a number of occasions. 24 In each of these cases, the
applicant did not dispute the reliability of the finding of a prohibited
substance within his or her body. Rather, each dispute focused on
whether the finding of the substance constituted a doping offence.
Where the Panel was satisfied that the presence of the substance equated
a doping offence, the strict liability regime was applied. In these cases,
the ARD noted that a consideration of the subjective elements of each
case is left in the hands of the IOC.
Finally, the AHD has addressed applications based on the Manipula-
tion of IF rules."z These cases illustrate that the ARD will be reluctant
to allow its adjudicative function to be used to achieve a strategic advan-
tage, not otherwise obtainable in the field of competition. The Samuel-
son case illustrates that it is not the application of IF rules that should be
guarded against, rather it is the exercise of such rules by a party who is
not directly affected. Thus, an application by a party who is not directly
affected by an event cannot be allowed to alter the competitive scheme
of the Games.
VII. CONCLUSION
The AHD addressed three times the number of disputes in Sydney as
it did in Atlanta. The drastic increase in the AHDs caseload indicates an
increase in the knowledge and familiarity of the CAS within the sports
community. Future Olympic Games will likely see a continuance of this
trend as athletes and sports bodies are now aware of the existence of an
121. Perez 2, supra note 62, at 32. The Panel interpreted the word "change," within
Article 46 of the Olympic Charter, broadly so as to allow Perez to compete.
122. Miranda 1, supra note 63.
123. For examples, see the Atlanta decision, Mendy, supra note 87, and the Sydney Cases:
Segura, supra note 57; Neykova, supra note 90.
124. Raducan, supra note 100; Rebagliati, supra note 77; Korneev & Gouliev, CAS Arb. ad
hoc Division O.G. Atlanta.
125. Samuelson, supra note 114; Smith, supra note 112.
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expedient forum where they can assert their rights. Athletes and sports
bodies alike can rest assured that each dispute before the AHD will be
addressed within the fundamental principles of fairness and due process
as well as through the application of the established principles of lex
sportiva. The current body of lex sportiva is by no means exhaustive and
the CAS will undoubtedly face new and complex issues that will lead to
the further development of lex sportiva.
